Legal Scholars And Political Theorists Codexery

Lon Fuller

American legal philosopher who argued for law's internal morality.

Lon Fuller

Lon Luvois Fuller, born on June 15, 1902, and passing away on April 8, 1978, was an American legal thinker who championed a non-religious, process-based version of natural law theory. He spent many years as a law professor at Harvard Law School, making his mark on American law through work in both legal philosophy and contract law. A key moment in modern legal thought came from his 1958 exchange with British philosopher H. L. A. Hart, published in the *Harvard Law Review* and known as the Hart–Fuller debate, which shaped the ongoing clash between legal positivism and natural law.

Fuller came into the world in Hereford, Texas, and spent his childhood in Southern California’s Imperial Valley. He studied at Stanford University for both his undergraduate degree and law school. His teaching career began at the University of Oregon School of Law, then moved to Duke University School of Law, where one of his students was future U.S. president Richard Nixon. In 1940, he joined Harvard Law School, taking the Carter chair of jurisprudence in 1948 and staying until his retirement in 1972. Outside academia, he practiced law at the Boston firm Ropes, Gray, Best, Coolidge & Rugg, focusing on labor arbitration. At Harvard, he taught contract law and jurisprudence, and worked to change how the law faculty taught its courses. Fuller died at age 75 in his Cambridge, Massachusetts home. He left behind his wife, Marjorie; two children from an earlier marriage, F. Brock Fuller and Cornelia F. Hopfield; two stepchildren, William D. Chapple and Mimi Hinnawi; and eight grandchildren.

In his 1958 debate with Hart and more fully in his 1964 book *The Morality of Law*, Fuller tried to find a middle ground between traditional natural law and legal positivism. Like most legal scholars of his time, he rejected older religious versions of natural law, which see human law as coming from a universally binding "higher law" rooted in God. But he accepted the idea, present in some traditional natural law writings, that deeply unjust laws or legal systems might not count as law at all. In his "Reply to Professor Hart," he questioned whether readers could share Hart’s outrage that postwar German courts called a Nazi statute "not a law." Fuller argued it would not have been better for those courts to study Nazi interpretive principles or to apply their own standards to the statute. He also dismissed Hart’s criticism that the courts dodged a moral dilemma by saying evil statutes cease to be law. Instead, Fuller insisted that a dictatorship wrapped in legal form can stray so far from the "inner morality of law" that it stops being a legal system. He pointed to systems where judges routinely ignore laws, cure irregularities with retroactive statutes, and use terror to escape even the pretense of legality.

Fuller also rejected legal positivism’s core claim that law and morality have no necessary link. He believed certain moral standards—what he called "principles of legality"—are built into the very idea of law. No rule counts as genuine law if it fails to meet these standards. Through these principles, law has an "inner morality" that ensures a basic level of fairness. While he admitted some laws might be so wicked they should not be obeyed, he argued that law’s positive features still create a defensible moral duty to follow them. For Fuller, all would-be legal rules must satisfy eight conditions to be genuine: they must be (1) general, (2) publicly announced, (3) forward-looking (applying only to future behavior), (4) clear enough to understand, (5) free of contradictions, (6) stable over time, (7) possible to obey, and (8) administered in line with their obvious meaning. Together, these principles guarantee that law embodies moral standards of respect, fairness, and predictability.

born
June 15, 1902
died
April 8, 1978
field
Legal philosophy, contract law
nationality
American
known_for
Hart–Fuller debate, The Morality of Law, procedural natural law theory

Verified Timeline

1902194019471948194919541958196419671968197219781984

Lore & Background

Fuller was born in Hereford, Texas and grew up in the Imperial Valley in Southern California. He went to Stanford University as an undergraduate and for law school. He taught at the University of Oregon School of Law, then at Duke University School of Law, where one of his students was future US president Richard Nixon. In 1940, he joined Harvard Law School, and was elevated to the Carter chair of jurisprudence in 1948. He remained at Harvard until retiring in 1972. He also practiced law with the firm of Ropes, Gray, Best, Coolidge & Rugg at Boston, where he worked in labor arbitration. At Harvard, he taught both contract law and jurisprudence, and pushed to reform the pedagogical approach of the law faculty. Fuller died at age 75 at his home in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He was survived by his wife, Marjorie, two children from a previous marriage – F. Brock Fuller and Cornelia F. Hopfield – and two stepchildren, William D. Chapple and Mimi Hinnawi. He had eight grandchildren. In his 1958 debate with Hart and more fully in The Morality of Law (1964), Fuller sought to steer a middle course between traditional natural law theory and legal positivism. Like most legal academics of his day, Fuller rejected traditional religious forms of natural law theory, which view human law as rooted in a rationally knowable and universally binding 'higher law' that derives from God. Fuller accepted the idea, found in the writings of some traditional natural law theorists, that in some cases unjust laws or legal systems are not law. In his famous 'Reply to Professor Hart', part of the Hart–Fuller debate, he wrote: 'When a system calling itself law is predicated upon a general disregard by judges of the terms of the laws they purport to enforce, when this system habitually cures its legal irregularities, even the grossest, by retroactive statutes, when it has only to resort to forays of terror in the streets, which no one dares challenge, in order to escape even those scant restraints imposed by the pretence of legality - when all these things have become true of a dictatorship, it is not hard for me, at least, to deny to it the name of law.' (p. 660) Fuller also denied the core claim of legal positivism that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. According to Fuller, certain moral standards, which he calls 'principles of legality,' are built into the very concept of law, so that nothing counts as genuine law that fails to meet these standards. In virtue of these principles of legality, the law has an inner morality that imposes a minimal morality of fairness. Some laws, he admits, may be so wicked or unjust that they should not be obeyed. But even in these cases, he argues, there are positive features of the law that impose a defensible moral duty to obey them. According to Fuller, all purported legal rules must meet eight minimal conditions in order to count as genuine laws. The rules must be (1) sufficiently general, (2) publicly promulgated, (3) prospective (i.e., applicable only to future behavior, not past), (4) at least minimally clear and intelligible, (5) free of contradictions, (6) relatively constant, so that they don't continuously change from day to day, (7) possible to obey, and (8) administered in a way that does not wildly diverge from their obvious or apparent meaning. These are Fuller's 'principles of legality.' Together, he argues, they guarantee that all law will embody certain moral standards of respect, fairness, and predictability that constitute important aspects of the rule of law. Fuller presents these issues in The Morality of Law with a story about an imaginary king named Rex who attempts to rule but finds he is unable to do so in any meaningful way when any of these conditions are not met. Fuller contends that the purpose of law is to subject 'human conduct to the governance of rules'. If any of the eight principles is flagrantly lacking in a system of governance, the system will not be a legal one. The more closely a system is able to adhere to them, the nearer it will be to the rule-of-law ideal, though in reality all systems must make compromises and will fall short of perfect ideals of clarity, consistency, stability, and so forth. In a review of The Morality of Law, Hart criticises Fuller's work, saying that these principles are merely ones of means-ends efficiency; it is inappropriate, he says, to call them a morality. Employing Fuller's eight principles of legality, one could just as well have an inner morality of poisoning as an inner morality of law, which Hart claims is absurd. In this phase of the argument, the positions of the disputants are transposed. Fuller proposes principles that would easily fit into a positivistic account of law and Hart points out that Fuller's principles could easily accommodate an immoral morality. Other critics have challenged Fuller's claim that there is a prima facie obligation to obey all laws. Some laws, it is claimed, are so unjust and oppressive that there is not even a presumptive moral duty to obey them. In 1954 Fuller proposed the term eunomics to describe 'the science, theory or study of good order and workable arrangements'. Stemming from behavioral systems theory, it was an attempt to fuse what Fuller saw as the inherent morality of law with the empirical data and methods of the objective sciences. Its main practical application appears to be as a form of industrial dispute resolution.

Reader's Guide

Fuller's significance lies in his articulation of a procedural natural law theory that challenged both traditional religious natural law and legal positivism. His 1958 debate with H. L. A. Hart in the Harvard Law Review became a landmark in jurisprudence, framing the modern conflict between positivism and natural law. In The Morality of Law (1964), Fuller argued that all systems of law contain an 'internal morality' that imposes a presumptive obligation of obedience. His eight principles of legality—generality, public promulgation, prospectivity, clarity, freedom from contradictions, constancy, possibility of obedience, and administration not wildly diverging from apparent meaning—were intended to show that law inherently embodies moral standards of fairness and predictability. Critics, including Hart, argued these principles are merely ones of means-ends efficiency, not morality. Others challenged Fuller's claim of a prima facie obligation to obey all laws. Robert S. Summers said in 1984: 'Fuller was one of the four most important American legal theorists of the last hundred years'. Fuller also proposed the term 'eunomics' in 1954 to describe 'the science, theory or study of good order and workable arrangements', stemming from behavioral systems theory. His works include Law in Quest of Itself (1940), Basic Contract Law (1947), Problems of Jurisprudence (1949), The Morality of Law (1964), Legal Fictions (1967), and Anatomy of Law (1968).

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