Sinai and Palestine campaign

Background

Egypt, though de jure part of the Ottoman Empire, had been de facto independent under the Muhammad Ali Dynasty since 1805. The British occupation of Egypt from 1882 limited this independence but did not change Egypt's legal status; the Khedive remained a vassal of the Ottoman Sultan. When the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, Khedive Abbas II sided with them, hoping to end British occupation. In response, the United Kingdom deposed Abbas, ended the legal fiction of Ottoman sovereignty, and declared the Sultanate of Egypt a British protectorate, with Hussein Kamel as Sultan.

The Suez Canal was strategically vital to Britain, shortening sea routes from India, New Zealand, and Australia to Europe. Egypt became a major wartime base, especially during the Gallipoli campaign. Defending the canal was difficult due to its size; there was no road from Cairo, and only one railway track crossed the 30 miles of desert to Ismaïlia, branching to Port Said and Suez. Control of the central area near Ismaïlia was strategically important because the three canal towns depended on fresh water from the Nile via the Sweet Water Canal.

Defence of the Suez Canal (1915–16)

From 26 January to 4 February 1915, a large Ottoman force attacked the Suez Canal. On 26 and 27 January, two smaller flanking columns made secondary attacks near Kantara in the north and near Suez in the south. The main attacks occurred on 3 and 4 February east of the Suez to Kantara Railway. Kress von Kressenstein's Ottoman Suez Expeditionary Force advanced from Southern Palestine, arriving at the canal on 2 February, and crossed near Ismailia on the morning of 3 February.

Only two Ottoman companies successfully crossed; the rest abandoned attempts due to strong British defence by 30,000 men of the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade and the Bikaner Camel Corps, supported by Egyptian Army and Indian mountain artillery. The British amassed troops, preventing further crossings. The Ottoman companies held their positions until the evening of 3 February, when the commanding officer ordered a withdrawal, which proceeded orderly to a camp ten km east of Ismailia.

Subsequently, Ottoman advance troops and outposts were maintained on the Sinai peninsula on a line between El Arish and Nekhl, with forces at Gaza and Beersheba. Over the following months, Kress von Kressenstein commanded mobile units and launched raids to disrupt canal traffic. He attacked on 8 April 1915, placing a mine in the canal that was located and disabled by a patrol. Between 5 and 13 May 1915 he led a charge.

These tactics were abandoned during the Gallipoli campaign. Von Kressenstein requested German special forces, promised for February 1916, and moved to the Fourth Army headquarters in Ain Sofar in August, then to Jerusalem. The Ottoman line of communication extended toward Egypt with the completion of the 100-mile railway section to Beersheba, opened on 17 October 1915.

Arab Revolt

In the early summer of 1916, the army of Sherif Hussein, the ruler of Mecca, struck at Ottoman forces in Mecca and the port city of Jeddah on the Arabian Peninsula’s southwest coast. Jeddah was taken quickly, giving the British navy access to its harbor. The fight for Mecca went on for three weeks. A sizable Ottoman force in Taif resisted until late September before surrendering.

Meanwhile, Feisal, Hussein’s third son, moved against the Ottoman garrison in Medina. The British wanted to widen this Arab uprising by creating trouble in the Ottoman regions crossed by the Hejaz Railway. This line, built with German help to move pilgrims, connected Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, Maan, Medina, and Mecca. It was vital for Ottoman communications, and its stone station houses could be used as strongpoints.

With the British gaining the upper hand in northern Sinai, Hussein was urged to gather backing for his revolt as far north as Baalbek, beyond Damascus. In London, the War Office, hoping to stir unrest across the Arab parts of the empire, backed General Murray’s plan to push forward to El Arish.

Sinai campaign of manoeuvre warfare

After the Battle of Romani on 12 August 1916, the Ottoman army fell back to Bir el Abd, the last oasis in the chain from Romani. Their main forward base was relocated to El Arish, with a fortified outpost at Bir el Mazar, where a small cluster of wells provided a steady water supply. On 18 June 1916, eleven aircraft from the 5th Wing, commanded by Colonel W. G. H. Salmond, carried out an air raid on El Arish. They flew out over the sea, then turned inland to approach from the southeast.

Two Ottoman planes on the ground and two of the ten hangars were set ablaze; bombs struck four other hangars and also hit troops. Three British planes were forced down, one into the sea. To advance on El Arish, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force needed vast quantities of ammunition, supplies, and a dependable water source. Under Brigadier-General Everard Blair, the Royal Engineers built a railway and pipeline across Sinai to El Arish.

From mid-August until the Battle for Magdhaba on 23 December 1916, British forces waited for this infrastructure. This stretch is often called a rest period for the Anzac Mounted Division, but the mounted troops were busy screening construction, patrolling newly taken areas, and conducting reconnaissances to improve maps using aerial photos. On 19 August, a patrol from the 5th Light Horse Regiment came across sixty-eight Ottoman soldiers nearly dead from thirst.

Instead of attacking, they gave them water and their horses, leading them five miles through deep sand until transport arrived.