Battle of the Hydaspes

The Battle of the Hydaspes, also called the Battle of Jhelum or the First Battle of Jhelum, was a conflict in May of 326 BC between Alexander the Great’s Macedonian Empire and the Pauravas, led by Porus. Fought along the Hydaspes River in what is now Pakistan’s Punjab province, it was part of Alexander’s Indian campaign. In what may have been their costliest fight, the Macedonians won a decisive victory, took Porus prisoner, and later incorporated large parts of Punjab into their empire. Alexander spared Porus and appointed him as satrap, effectively restoring him as the region’s ruler.

Despite close watch by Porus’s forces, Alexander’s choice to cross the monsoon-swollen Hydaspes and strike Porus’s army from the flank is often considered one of his finest tactical moves. The battle is historically significant because it brought Greek political and cultural influence to the Indian subcontinent, an impact that lasted for centuries. After the fight, Alexander pushed east into modern-day India, aiming to cross the Ganges River. But at the Hyphasis (now the Beas) in 326 BC, his weary troops—after nearly eight years of campaigning—refused to go further. Their arms and armor were worn out, and the army feared disaster in India. The Hyphasis became Alexander’s farthest point in India, and when he left, he placed King Porus in charge of that easternmost territory.

**Background**

After defeating the last Achaemenid forces under Bessus and Spitamenes in 328 BC, Alexander began a new campaign to expand his empire into India in 327 BC. He fortified Bactria with 10,000 men and then invaded India through the Khyber Pass. Although his army was much larger overall, at the battle an estimated 40,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry crossed the river in time to engage the enemy. Alexander suffered heavy losses compared to his earlier victories. The main Greek column took the Khyber Pass, while a smaller force under Alexander himself went north, capturing the fortress of Aornos (modern Pir-Sar)—a site of mythological importance because, according to legend, Herakles had failed to take it during his own Indian campaign. There, the Hindu clans of the Hindu Kush gave Alexander’s army its toughest resistance yet, but Alexander still won, despite being outnumbered somewhere between 3:1 and 5:1, depending on the source.

In early spring of the next year, Alexander allied with Taxiles (also known as Ambhi), the King of Taxila. They combined forces against Taxiles’ neighbor, Porus the Elder, King of Hydaspes, who had refused Alexander’s demand to surrender and was preparing for war. Alexander needed to defeat Porus to continue eastward; leaving such a strong opponent on his flank would endanger future campaigns. He also could not show weakness if he wanted to keep the loyalty of the Indian princes he had already subdued. Porus had to defend his kingdom and chose the perfect spot to block Alexander’s advance. Though he lost the battle, he became Alexander’s most successful recorded opponent. Historian Peter Green notes that Porus’s performance in the battle outclassed both Memnon of Rhodes and Spitamenes.

**Pre-battle maneuvers**

Alexander set up camp on the north bank of the Jhelum River (then called the Hydaspes). In spring 326 BC, Porus drew up his forces on the south bank to prevent any crossing. The river was deep and fast, making a direct assault nearly suicidal. Alexander knew a straightforward approach would fail and searched for alternative fords. Each night, he moved his mounted troops up and down the riverbank, while Porus followed his movements. Eventually, Alexander found a suitable crossing about 27 km (17 mi) upstream from his camp, where an uninhabited, wooded island split the river. He led his troops across, landing on the island while his men waded through the water. His plan was a classic pincer move: he would attack the Indian cavalry flanking both sides of Porus’s main force from the right. He left his general Craterus behind with most of the army to keep Porus unaware of the crossing, while he took a strong contingent upstream—according to the 2nd-century AD Greek historian Arrian, 6,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, though it was probably larger. Craterus was ordered to ford the river and attack if Porus faced Alexander with his full army, or to hold position if Porus only sent part of his force. Other commanders—Meleager, Attalus, and Gorgias—were told to cross at various points during the maneuver.

Alexander’s crossing of the Hydaspes in the face of Indian forces on the opposite bank was a notable achievement. The complex preparations involved many feints and deceptions. Porus was kept constantly moving until he decided it was a bluff and relaxed. Each time Alexander visited the crossing site, he took an inland detour to keep the plan secret. It was also reported that an Alexander look-alike held court in a mock royal tent near the base camp. Alexander quietly moved his part of the army upstream and then crossed the river in utmost secrecy, using skin floats filled with hay, as well as smaller vessels cut in half and thirty-oared galleys split into three parts. Meanwhile, Craterus carried out frequent feints to mislead Porus.