Mental representation

Lore & Background

Mental representation, also known as cognitive representation, is a hypothetical internal cognitive symbol that stands for external reality or its abstractions. It encompasses mental imagery of things not present to the senses, allowing the mind to represent objects never experienced or that do not exist. While visual imagery is most commonly recalled, representations can involve any sensory modality, including hearing, smell, or taste. Stephen Kosslyn proposed that such images aid problem-solving by enabling visualization of objects. The process by which the brain interprets and stores representational content remains debated. Historically, the classical representational theory, traceable to Thomas Hobbes and dominant in classical empiricism, held that mental representations were images or "ideas" of objects. Modern proponents like Jerry Fodor and Steven Pinker instead posit an internal language of thought, or "mentalese," where thoughts are symbolic structures with syntax and semantics analogous to natural languages. Philosopher P. Thagard noted that most cognitive scientists agree knowledge consists of mental representations, and that mental procedures operate via these representations for thinking and action. Recently, mental representations have been conceptualized as contents of episodic memory, consolidated in long-term memory and activated during retrieval. Representationalism, or indirect realism, holds that representations are the primary means of accessing external reality. This theory is divided into strong and weak versions: strong representationalism aims to reduce phenomenal character to intentional content, offering a potential solution to the hard problem of consciousness, while weak representationalism claims only that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content. Strong representationalism further splits into restricted (applying only to certain states like visual perception) and unrestricted versions, the latter seeking to account for all phenomenal states.

Reader's Guide

The representational theory of mind, also known as indirect realism, postulates that mental representations act as intermediaries between the observing subject and external objects. This theory contrasts with naïve or direct realism. The classical version, traceable to Thomas Hobbes, held that representations were images or 'ideas.' Modern adherents like Jerry Fodor and Steven Pinker view the representational system as an internal language of thought (mentalese), with symbolic structures possessing syntax and semantics. Canadian philosopher P. Thagard noted that most cognitive scientists agree knowledge in the human mind consists of mental representations, and that people have mental procedures operating via these representations for thinking and action. Mental representations have recently been conceptualized as contents of episodic memory consolidated in long-term memory, which may emerge as conscious experiences during retrieval, though sufficient activation via thalamocortical pathways alone is not sufficient for generating conscious experiences.

Did You Know?

• Mental representations allow representing things that have never been experienced as well as things that do not exist.
• The classical representational theory probably traces back to Thomas Hobbes.
• Strong representationalism attempts to reduce phenomenal character to intentional content, while weak representationalism claims only that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content.
• Moods are often cited as counterexamples to unrestricted representationalism because they appear to lack intentional content.