Logical positivism
A movement seeking scientific philosophy through empirical verification.
Logical positivism, also known as logical empiricism or neo-positivism, was a philosophical movement rooted in the empiricist tradition. Its proponents sought to create a scientific philosophy, aiming to make philosophical discourse as authoritative and meaningful as empirical science itself. A central but contested thesis was the verification principle, or verifiability criterion of meaning, which held that a statement is cognitively meaningful only if it can be verified through empirical observation or is a tautology. This criterion rejected statements from metaphysics, theology, ethics, and aesthetics as cognitively meaningless. The movement emerged in the late 1920s among philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians in the Vienna Circle, led by Moritz Schlick, and the Berlin Circle, where Hans Reichenbach was prominent. A 1929 manifesto by Otto Neurath, Hans Hahn, and Rudolf Carnap summarized the Vienna Circle’s positions. Early on, some members recognized the verifiability criterion was too stringent, as it rejected universal scientific statements. This led to a split: a radical left wing, led by Neurath and Carnap, proposed weakening the criterion in a program called the "liberalisation of empiricism," while a conservative right wing, led by Schlick and Friedrich Waismann, sought to classify universal statements as analytic truths. Neurath advocated moving from Mach’s phenomenalism to physicalism, a shift opposed by Schlick. The movement flourished in several European centers through the 1930s, but by the end of World War II, many members had settled in the English-speaking world, and the project shifted to less radical goals within the philosophy of science. By the 1950s, problems with its central tenets drew escalating criticism from philosophers such as Willard Van Orman Quine and Karl Popper, and from within the movement from Carl Hempel. These unresolved issues led to the movement’s decline and abandonment by the 1960s.
- born
- Late 1920s
- died
- By the 1960s
- field
- Philosophy, philosophy of science
- nationality
- German, Austrian, later English-speaking world
- known_for
- Verifiability criterion of meaning, rejection of metaphysics and theology as cognitively meaningless
Lore & Background
Logical positivism established its theoretical foundations in the empiricism of David Hume, Auguste Comte, and Ernst Mach, along with the positivism of Comte and Mach, defining its exemplar of science in Einstein's general theory of relativity. Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus provided theoretical foundations for the verifiability principle, introducing philosophy as 'critique of language' and distinguishing between intelligible and nonsensical discourse. The Vienna Circle was led principally by Moritz Schlick, while the Berlin Circle was pre-eminent with Hans Reichenbach. A central thesis endorsed by some logical positivists (e.g., Schlick) and rejected by others (e.g., Carnap and Neurath) was the verification principle, according to which a statement is cognitively meaningful only if it can be verified through empirical observation or if it is a tautology. This criterion rejected statements of metaphysics, theology, ethics, and aesthetics as cognitively meaningless. Early in the movement, Carnap, Hahn, Neurath, and others recognized that the verifiability criterion was too stringent, rejecting universal statements vital to scientific hypothesis. A radical left wing led by Neurath and Carnap proposed revisions to weaken the criterion, while a conservative right wing led by Schlick and Waismann sought to classify universal statements as analytic truths.
Reader's Guide
Logical positivism emerged in the late 1920s among philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians in the Vienna and Berlin Circles, flourishing in several European centers through the 1930s. The movement sought to create a scientific philosophy as authoritative as empirical science, drawing on the empiricism of David Hume, Auguste Comte, and Ernst Mach, as well as Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and Percy Bridgman’s operationalism. A central but contested thesis was the verification principle, which held that a statement is cognitively meaningful only if empirically verifiable or tautological, thereby rejecting metaphysics, theology, ethics, and aesthetics as meaningless in factual terms. This principle split the Vienna Circle into a radical left wing, led by Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, who sought to weaken the criterion through “liberalisation of empiricism,” and a conservative right wing, led by Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann, who aimed to reconcile universal statements as analytic truths. The movement also opposed neo-Kantianism and Martin Heidegger’s obscure metaphysics. By the end of World War II, many members had relocated to English-speaking countries, shifting the project toward less radical goals in the philosophy of science. Despite its ambition, logical positivism became stereotyped as an agenda to regulate science. By the 1950s, intractable problems in its central tenets drew criticism from Willard Van Orman Quine, Karl Popper, and Carl Hempel, leading to its decline and abandonment by the 1960s, with philosopher John Passmore declaring it “dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes” in 1967.
Did You Know?
- The verifiability criterion was endorsed by some logical positivists (e.g., Schlick) and rejected by others (e.g., Carnap and Neurath).
- Logical positivists were influenced by Percy Bridgman's operationalism, whereby a concept is not knowable unless it can be measured experimentally.
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