3rd Bengal Light Cavalry

History

In January 1796, the East India Company's board of directors ordered Governor-General John Shore to raise four 465-strong native cavalry regiments for the Bengal Army. The 3rd Bengal Native Cavalry was raised the following year in Oude by Captain John P. Pigot. The terms "Bengal Native Cavalry" and "Bengal Light Cavalry" were used interchangeably initially, but by 1857 the regiment was officially called the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry. During the Second Anglo-Maratha War, the regiment fought at the Battle of Delhi and the Battle of Laswari in 1803 under General Gerard Lake against Maharaja Daulat Rao Sindhia, earning an Honorary Standard inscribed "Lake and Victory" and an extra Jemadar, along with the battle honours "Delhi 1803", "Leswarree", and "Deig".

The regiment was present throughout the Siege of Bharatpur from December 1825 to January 1826, taking part in the final assault and earning the "Bhurtpore" battle honour. In the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1839, it fought at the Battle of Ghazni, receiving the "Affghanistan 1839" and "Ghuznee 1839" honours. During the First Anglo-Sikh War of 1845–1846, the regiment fought at Aliwal and Sobraon, earning battle honours for both.

Meerut

In 1857, the regiment had been stationed at Meerut for three years as part of the Meerut Division under Major General William Henry Hewitt. The East India Company planned to supply its Native regiments with the Pattern 1853 Enfield rifle, whose ammunition came in greased paper cartridges. Standard drill required biting the cartridge open, but rumours spread that the grease was made from pig and cow fat, taboo to both Hindus and Muslims. Lieutenant Colonel George M. Carmichael-Smyth, in temporary command, modified the drill so cartridges would be torn by hand.

On 23 April, he announced a parade for the next day using the muskets and ammunition the men had used for years. That evening, the men decided to refuse the cartridges; some told a junior officer that using any cartridge would expose them to accusations from comrades of having fired the objectionable ones. Carmichael-Smyth proceeded with the parade despite these concerns. During the night, his tent and some buildings were destroyed by fire.

When Carmichael-Smyth arrived, no man had taken his ammunition. He ordered the Havildar Major to perform the drill, then attempted to distribute cartridges to the rest, but they refused despite his speech reminding them the cartridges were the same type used for years. Of the 90 men, 85 refused the order to accept the ammunition.

Mutiny

On the following Sunday at about 18:00, a general disturbance was reported in the town bazaar, and columns of smoke rose from burning buildings. The 60th Rifles, waiting outside the local church for a service delayed by warm weather, heard gunfire and headed to their barracks, armed themselves, and assembled on their parade square. Mounted troopers from the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry attacked them but, finding the 60th Rifles armed and waiting, rode away directly to the jail.

With the help of a local blacksmith, they released their imprisoned comrades. Simultaneously, soldiers from the 11th and 20th Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry mutinied, killing some officers and civilians while helping others escape, and burning buildings. One company of the 60th Rifles guarded the treasury, another guarded their barracks, and the remainder, joined by the 6th Dragoon Guards, went to the Native Infantry barracks, finding them ablaze and deserted.

Hewitt, fearing attack, withdrew the troops back toward their barracks and encamped them nearby. One troop of 80 to 90 members of the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry remained loyal to their officers. The mutineers, having freed their comrades, returned to Meerut and joined rioting with civilians, then all mutineers left for Delhi. The military authorities did not discover their departure until the following morning and did not know the direction they had taken.

Historical perspective

The handling of the situation drew criticism. Carmichael-Smyth's superior, Hewitt, felt that had the firing drill parade not been held, the cartridge issue "would have blown over. Lieutenant John Campbell MacNabb, a junior officer of the regiment, considered the drill parade unnecessary and stated that the men's dislike of their commanding officer aggravated the events. Hewitt later faced criticism from Lieutenant General Sir Patrick Grant, acting Commander in Chief after Anson's death, and from John Lawrence, Commissioner of Punjab.

Hewitt's command of the Meerut Division was removed. At a subsequent appeal, Hewitt and Brigadier General Archdale Wilson of the Bengal Artillery blamed each other; Hewitt said Wilson was responsible for the tactics, while Wilson stated that as overall commander, Hewitt bore responsibility. Hewitt lost the appeal. Historian Kim A. Wagner, in his 2010 book The Great Fear of 1857, stated that the senior officers' fear of making a "wrong decision" led them to make no decision at all, "with devastating results."