Second Battle of the Aisne

Background

Nivelle believed that German forces had been exhausted by the 1916 battles of Verdun and the Somme and could not withstand a breakthrough offensive, which he expected to complete within 24 to 48 hours. The main attack on the Aisne was to be preceded by a British diversion at Arras. Nivelle threatened resignation if the offensive did not proceed, and he had the enthusiastic backing of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George. French Prime Minister Aristide Briand supported Nivelle, but Lyautey resigned during a dispute with the Chamber of Deputies, and the Briand government fell; a new government under Alexandre Ribot took office on 20 March.

The plan, involving about 1.2 million troops and 7,000 guns on a front from Reims to Roye, suffered delays and information leaks. By April, the Germans had received intelligence of the Allied plan and strengthened their defences. The German retreat to the Hindenburg Line (Operation Alberich) devastated a belt up to 25 miles deep and freed 13 to 14 German divisions, which moved to the Aisne, raising the German garrison to 38 divisions against 53 French divisions.

Prelude

During the German withdrawal to the Siegfriedstellung (Hindenburg Line) in March 1917, a modest withdrawal occurred near Soissons. On 17 March, German defences at Crouy and Côte 132 were found empty; as French troops followed up, German counter-attacks at Vregny and Margival slowed the pursuit to a step-by-step advance. By April, the French had progressed only beyond Neuville-sur-Margival and Leuilly. On 1 April, a French attack along the Ailette–Laon road reached the outskirts of Laffaux and Vauxaillon; Vauxeny and Vauxaillon were occupied a few days later.

A new German manual of 1 December 1916, Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg, replaced the policy of unyielding defence with one of holding positions suitable for artillery observation and communication. Defending infantry would operate in zones: an outpost zone up to 3,000 yards deep, a main line of resistance on a reverse slope, a Grosskampfzone (battle zone) 1,500–2,500 yards deep, and a rückwärtige Kampfzone (rear battle zone) for the reserve battalion of each regiment.

Battle

By early April, the French Third Army—all that remained of the Groupe d'armées du Nord after its First Army was shifted to the Groupe d'armées de Reserve—held a line of three corps. It opened operations with probing strikes against German observation posts near St. Quentin on 1–4 and 10 April. On 1 April, large reconnaissance units moved toward the Dallon spur but could not secure a foothold in the German forward defenses, though the British Fourth Army to the north did take the woods around Savy.

A heavier French assault on Dallon failed on 2 April. The next day, following a "terrific" bombardment, the Third Army attacked along an eight-mile front north of the Castres–Essigny-le-Grand–Benay line, between the Somme canal at Dallon and the Oise. After another push on 4 April, the French captured Dallon, Giffecourt, Cerizy, and hills 111, 108, and 121 south of Urvillers, leaving the German salient at the Ham–St Quentin–La Fère triangle exposed.

The fighting took place in bitter cold and driving rain, with supply shortages worsened by German road destruction and massive traffic jams on the few repaired routes. East of the Oise and north of the Aisne, the Third Army seized the southern and north-western outskirts of Laffaux and Vauxeny. German counter-attacks north of the Aisne on 4 April were beaten back south of Vauxeny and Laffaux. The French took Moy on the Oise's west bank, along with Urvillers and Grugies on the Somme's east bank.

North of La Folie farm, the Germans were driven back, and the French captured three 155 mm howitzers and several Luftstreitkräfte lorries. Beyond Dallon, French patrols pushed into St. Quentin's south-western suburb.

Aftermath

Robert Doughty wrote in 2005 that the offensive advanced the front line by 6–7 km on the front of the Sixth Army, which took 5,300 prisoners and much equipment. The operation had been planned as a decisive blow; by 20 April it was clear the strategic intent had not been achieved, and by 25 April most fighting had ended. Casualties reached 20 per cent in the French armies by 10 May, with some divisions suffering over 60 per cent. On 3 May, the French 2nd Division refused orders; similar refusals and mutiny spread through the armies, and the Nivelle Offensive was abandoned in confusion on 9 May.

Politicians and the public were stunned; on 16 May, Nivelle was sacked and moved to North Africa. He was replaced by the more cautious Pétain, with Foch as chief of the General Staff, who adopted a strategy of 'healing and defence' to avoid casualties and restore morale. Pétain had 40 to 62 mutineers shot as examples and introduced reforms to improve welfare, which did much to restore morale. Operations in Champagne on 20 May ended the Nivelle Offensive; most of the Chemin-des-Dames plateau, especially the east end dominating the plain north of the Aisne, had been captured, along with Bois-des-Buttes, Ville-aux-Bois, Bois-des-Boches, and the German first and second positions.

South of the river, the Fifth and Tenth armies advanced west of the Brimont Heights; east of Reims, the Fourth Army captured most of the Moronvilliers massif and Auberive. The cost in casualties and morale was great, but German losses were also high, and the tactical success of capturing elaborately fortified positions and defeating counter-attacks reduced German morale. The Germans were forced out of the most elaborately fortified positions on the Western Front and failed to recapture them; Vimy Ridge, the Scarpe Heights, the Chemin des Dames, and the Moronvilliers massif, held for over two years and fortified as impregnable, were all lost in six weeks.