Dedovshchina

{{lang|ru|Dedovshchina}} as a phenomenon

Dedovshchina creates unofficial hierarchical relationships that run parallel to the formal military chain of command, and officers are sometimes aware of it and may use it to maintain order. Some high-ranking military officials, such as Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, have publicly attributed the practice to societal ills transferred into the army. Objective studies, however, indicate that dedovshchina arises from non-statutory economic activity within the armed forces, serving as an auxiliary tool for leadership that shifts responsibilities to informal leaders in exchange for benefits like early dismissals or reduced physical activity.

The phenomenon is often accompanied by humiliation and physical violence, with victims being those who hold low status in the informal hierarchy, determined by factors such as seniority, physical strength, psychophysiological traits, or nationality. According to Amangeldy Kurmetuly, dedovshchina persists because the modern Russian military largely consists of men who performed poorly in school and could not enter university, and they redirect the pressure they received from authority figures onto weaker individuals.

In the Soviet Army

The first recorded instance of non-statutory relations in the Red Army occurred in 1919, when three older soldiers of the 1st Regiment of the 30th Division beat to death a fellow soldier, Kupriyanov, because he refused to do their work for the "grandfathers"; the perpetrators were shot under wartime law. One theory traces the origin of systematic dedovshchina to the law of 12 October 1967, which changed conscription terms and caused two groups of conscripts—those serving three years and those serving two years—to be present simultaneously.

However, researcher A.D. Glotochkin had already studied psychological problems among young soldiers before 1967, coinciding with the first wave of conscript shortages; the five-million-strong Soviet army could be up to a third understrength due to World War II demographic losses. That same year, due to the demographic crisis, the decision was made to draft conscripts with criminal histories, a group previously excluded. Ideologically presented as correction, this practice introduced criminal networks and thieves' jargon into the barracks, along with ritual humiliation and abuse copied from prison customs.

Additionally, when service time was reduced from three to two years, for a period both those completing their third year and new recruits serving one year less were in the same unit, angering those who had already served two years and still had time left; they took out their frustration on new arrivals.

In the Russian Army

Dedovshchina, the hazing and exploitation of conscripts in the Russian military, stems from a system where commanders bear little responsibility for their troops. Military analyst Alexander Goltz has described this as a Soviet-style mass mobilization model that treats conscripts like slaves. The practice began in the 1960s as a way for units to manage unofficial economic activities and has continued to evolve. In 1993, 169 conscripts died from dedovshchina, which analyst Benjamin S. Lambeth blamed on severe incompetence and corruption.

Many reported cases involve commanders using young soldiers for personal profit. For instance, in August 2002, Senior Lieutenant R. Komarnitsky ordered Privates Tsvetkov and Legonkov to leave their unit, travel to Samara, and earn money through non-military work, demanding 4,000 rubles monthly. When they refused, older officers pressured and beat them. In October 2003, soldiers from a Guards motorized rifle regiment in Samara who worked at Carton-Pack LLC said they received no combat training during this "extra work."

Private E. Holtsiv reported firing his weapon only once during his entire service. On October 10, 2003, activists from "Mother's Right" filmed dozens of soldiers from military unit No. 12670 of the Volgograd Railway being transported to jobs: 32 for weeding, 10 for the Rotor football club, with minibuses and foreign cars picking them up. Up to 200 soldiers left the unit that day. Inspections followed, including by General Gurov from Moscow, and the commander and his deputy were disciplined.

However, the illegal work continued until October 2004, with offenders becoming more cautious and staging fake tasks like breaking down container boxes on base.

Hierarchical stages

The meaning of terms for hierarchical stages can vary by branch of service or military unit, as well as by length of service. In army slang, servicemen are categorized by time served: those in quarantine before the oath are called "smells," "drishchy," "disembodied spirits," or "quarantines." Those who have served up to six months are known as "spirits," "elephants" (Navy), "salagi," "beavers," "salabons," "geese" (Airborne Forces), "vasky," "batky," "babies," "hedgehogs," "sparrows" (Air Force), "checks" (Air Force), "chekists" (Air Force), "shchygli," or "chyzhi."

Servicemen who have served six months are called "elephants" (Airborne Forces), "pomose," "laces," "geese," "crows" (Air Force), "crucian carp" (Navy), "young," "walruses," "goldfinches," or "mammoths." Those who have served one year are termed "skulls," "scoops," "yearlings" (Navy), "bold carp" (Navy), "pheasants," "boilers," or "smears." "Grandfathers" (dedy) and "dembeli" are those who have served one and a half years; the phenomenon's name derives from "grandfather."

"Dembeli" or "citizens" are conscripts who have received an order to be retired. In the Navy until 1990, there were exactly seven hierarchical steps, ranging from "spirit" (up to six months, suitable only for dirty work) through "crucian carp," "bold carp," "one-and-a-half" (the first degree of untouchables, subject only to moral pressure), and "podgodok" (two years, the most liberal stage).