Environmental ethics
Field reconstructing arguments for protecting natural entities and sustainable resource use.
Environmental ethics, as a branch of practical philosophy, systematically examines the types of reasoning used to justify protecting natural entities and using natural resources sustainably. The field is structured around three major competing frameworks: anthropocentrism, which centers human interests; physiocentrism (or ecocentrism), which extends moral consideration to ecosystems and non-human life; and theocentrism, which grounds environmental obligations in religious or spiritual beliefs. This discipline has shaped numerous other fields, including environmental law, sociology, ecotheology, ecological economics, ecology, and geography.
The academic field emerged in response to landmark works and events. Rachel Carson’s and Murray Bookchin’s writings, along with the first Earth Day in 1970, spurred philosophers to address environmental problems. Aldo Leopold’s “A Sand County Almanac,” republished before that Earth Day, contained “The Land Ethic,” which argued that philosophical roots underlay the ecological crisis. Two pivotal 1960s *Science* articles—Lynn White’s “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis” (1967) and Garrett Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968)—also proved crucial. Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss coined “Deep Ecology” in 1972, advocating intrinsic value for all non-human entities. In 1973, Australian philosopher Richard Routley (later Sylvan) questioned whether a new environmental ethic was needed at the World Congress of Philosophy. Early journals included Næss’s *Inquiry*, the US-based *Environmental Ethics* (1979), Canada’s *The Trumpeter* (1983), and Britain’s *Environmental Values* (1992).
Scholars like Alan Marshall have categorized ethical approaches. His “Libertarian Extension” extends equal rights to non-humans, echoing civil liberties. This includes Andrew Brennan’s eco-humanism, which grants ethical worth to all ontological entities simply for existing, and Næss’s deep ecology. Peter Singer’s work also fits here, arguing for expanding moral worth to non-human animals to avoid speciesism, though he initially excluded non-sentient entities. Marshall’s “Ecologic Extension” emphasizes interdependence and diversity, viewing collective ecological entities—like ecosystems or the entire planet—as having intrinsic value. This aligns with Holmes Rolston’s approach and James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, which portrays Earth as
- field
- Environmental philosophy
- known_for
- Reconstructing argumentation for protecting natural entities and sustainable resource use
- main_paradigms
- Anthropocentrism, physiocentrism (ecocentrism), theocentrism
- influenced_disciplines
- Environmental law, environmental sociology, ecotheology, ecological economics, ecology, environmental geography
Lore & Background
Environmental ethics is a branch of practical philosophy that reconstructs the essential types of argumentation for protecting natural entities and promoting the sustainable use of natural resources. The field’s main competing paradigms are anthropocentrism, physiocentrism (also called ecocentrism), and theocentrism. It influences disciplines such as environmental law, environmental sociology, ecotheology, ecological economics, ecology, and environmental geography. The academic field grew in response to works by Rachel Carson and Murray Bookchin, as well as the first Earth Day in 1970, which prompted philosophers to examine the philosophical dimensions of environmental problems. Aldo Leopold’s “A Sand County Almanac,” republished before that Earth Day, contained his essay “The Land Ethic,” which argued that the ecological crisis had philosophical roots. Two influential papers in *Science* were Lynn White’s “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis” and Garrett Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Arne Næss’s concept of “Deep Ecology,” coined in 1972, advocated for granting intrinsic value to all non-human entities. Richard Routley’s 1973 paper questioned the need for a new environmental ethic. The first international journal in the field was Næss’s *Inquiry*; the first US-based journal, *Environmental Ethics*, appeared in 1979, followed by Canada’s *The Trumpeter* in 1983 and Britain’s *Environmental Values* in 1992. Scholars like Alan Marshall have categorized ethical approaches into Libertarian Extension, which extends equal rights to non-human members of the community; Ecologic Extension, emphasizing interdependence and intrinsic value of collective ecological entities; and Conservation Ethics. Libertarian Extension includes Andrew Brennan’s eco-humanism, which grants ethical worth to all ontological entities simply because they exist, and Peter Singer’s bio-centric argument against speciesism, though Singer remained skeptical of intrinsic value for non-sentient entities. Ecologic Extension, akin to eco-holism, includes Holmes Rolston’s work and the Gaia hypothesis, which views Earth as a unified, holistic entity with independent ethical worth.
Reader's Guide
Environmental ethics has shaped how human beings consider ethical decisions regarding the environment, raising questions about deforestation, species extinction, future generations, and planetary boundaries. Scholars such as Alan Marshall have categorized three general ethical approaches: Libertarian Extension (extending equal rights to non-humans), Ecologic Extension (recognizing interdependence of all biological and some abiological entities), and Conservation Ethics (focusing on the environment's utility to humans). These categories reflect ongoing debates between intrinsic value (deep ecology) and instrumental value (shallow ecology). The field also engages applied theology, with Abrahamic religious scholars using theology to motivate public action, though some have used such ideas to justify consumptive tendencies. Environmental ethics continues to influence policy discussions, including those at the Kyoto summit and the Rio Earth Summit.
Did You Know?
- Alan Marshall identified three ethical approaches: Libertarian Extension, Ecologic Extension, and Conservation Ethics.
The Character-Centered Alternative
Virtue ethics, rooted in the Greek concept of aretē, stands as a distinct philosophical tradition that places the moral character of the individual at the center of ethical inquiry. Rather than asking whether an action produces the best outcome or whether it fulfills a duty, virtue ethics asks what kind of person one is becoming through one's dispositions, habits of thought, and patterns of feeling. This approach is typically set in opposition to consequentialism, which evaluates morality through the goodness of results, and deontology, which anchors rightness in moral obligation. Importantly, virtue theorists do not dismiss consequences or duties as irrelevant; they simply refuse to let those considerations take the lead. Instead, they foreground traits of character and, in many formulations, the broader ideal of human flourishing. The emphasis falls on the individual's inner life—how one perceives, reasons, and responds emotionally—rather than on isolated acts or their downstream effects. This makes virtue ethics a fundamentally personal and relational framework, concerned with who a person is rather than merely what a person does.
The Emotional Architecture of Virtue
A virtue, in this tradition, is not a casual habit or a surface behavior but a deep-seated disposition that shapes how a person thinks, feels, and acts across an entire domain of life. Its counterpart, the vice, is an equally ingrained pattern of poor reasoning and misdirected feeling. Crucially, virtue ethics insists that moral excellence demands both intellectual and affective competence. A genuinely generous individual does not merely calculate when assistance is warranted; that person also experiences pleasure in giving and feels no inner resistance. This dual requirement creates a rich taxonomy of moral agents. The vicious person reasons badly and latches onto the wrong emotional objects. The incontinent person knows the right course yet is swept off by feeling. The merely continent person resists temptation through sheer willpower. The virtuous person, by contrast, acts rightly and feels rightly in harmony. Rosalind Hursthouse captures this by noting that in Aristotelian thought, emotions carry genuine moral weight: the virtuous person feels the right emotions, toward the right objects, for the right reasons, on the right occasions.
Practical Wisdom and the Flourishing Life
Two interlocking concepts anchor much of virtue ethics: phronesis and eudaimonia. Phronesis, often rendered as practical wisdom or prudence, is an acquired capacity that lets its bearer discern the best course of action in any particular circumstance. Unlike abstract theoretical knowledge, phronesis is inherently action-oriented, and thinkers like John McDowell describe it as a kind of perceptual sensitivity to what a situation calls for. Eudaimonia, meanwhile, names the ultimate telos—the objective state of human flourishing that characterizes a well-lived life. For Aristotle, the most influential voice in this tradition, eudaimonia is not a fleeting subjective mood but an objective condition achieved through the exercise of reason, humanity's defining capacity, in accordance with complete virtue. He located this activity within the polis, the community of fellow citizens. The virtue of a thing, in this framework, is whatever enables it to fulfill its purpose: a knife's virtue is sharpness, a racehorse's is speed. Identifying human virtues therefore requires an account of what humans are for. Not all contemporary virtue theories retain this teleological structure; some propose alternative ends or abandon teleology altogether.
From Socrates to the Modern Table
The lineage of virtue ethics stretches back to the ancient Greek philosophical tradition, where Socrates first drew sustained attention to the moral character of the individual. Plato and Aristotle each developed the idea in distinct ways, and the Stoics carried it forward as well. In Plato's Republic, the four cardinal virtues—wisdom, justice, fortitude, and temperance—receive systematic treatment. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics builds on this foundation while introducing a different relationship between virtue and happiness: where Plato treats virtue as an end in itself, with friendship serving as a useful means, Aristotle sees the virtues as instrumental in safeguarding authentic human relationships, without which the pursuit of a good life falters. In the modern era the tradition has diversified considerably. Some contemporary versions still define virtues in terms of human flourishing, while others redefine them as traits that promote goods defined independently of virtue, effectively merging the framework with consequentialist reasoning. Still others reject teleology entirely. Despite these divergences, most virtue theorists share the conviction that ethics is ultimately demonstrated through the lived practice of virtue rather than through the mere observance of rules or the calculation of outcomes.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is Environmental ethics?
Environmental ethics is a practical philosophy branch nested within environmental philosophy, dedicated to rebuilding the core argumentative frameworks for defending natural entities and managing natural resources sustainably. It gives structured moral reasoning to the question of why nature deserves protection.
What are Environmental ethics's powers or role?
Its central function is reconstructing the essential types of argumentation that justify protecting natural entities and using natural resources in a sustainable manner. It serves as the bridge between abstract moral reasoning and concrete environmental policy.
What are Environmental ethics's main competing paradigms?
Three rival paradigms shape the field: anthropocentrism, physiocentrism (also called ecocentrism), and theocentrism. Each offers a different answer to where moral value in the natural world ultimately resides.
Why is Environmental ethics important?
It exerts direct influence on a wide range of applied disciplines, including environmental law, environmental sociology, ecotheology, ecological economics, ecology, and environmental geography. Without its argumentative frameworks, those fields would lack a coherent ethical backbone for their policies and research.
What broader field does Environmental ethics belong to?
Environmental ethics is an established field of practical philosophy that sits squarely within the larger discipline of environmental philosophy. It is the applied, argument-reconstructing wing of that broader philosophical tradition.
More in Miscellaneous Philosophy And Religion 1-24
Spotted an error? Know more?
This is a living reference — every entry is fact-audited, and reader corrections feed straight into our audit queue. Suggest an edit · See this site's audit record
