Battle of Ager Falernus

Prelude

When rumors of the disaster at Lake Trasimene reached Rome, the city fell into panic and confusion. The praetor Marcus Pomponius confirmed the worst by bluntly announcing in the Forum, “We have been defeated in a great battle.” The Senate held continuous sessions to decide what to do. Three days later, word arrived that Maharbal had crushed the Roman cavalry. Realizing how dire things were, the Senate and people decided to appoint a dictator for the first time since 249 BC to take charge of the war. Because one consul was dead and the other was away with his army, the Senate elected the dictator itself rather than having a consul nominate one.

Quintus Fabius Maximus, a patrician from the Fabii family who had originally proposed holding an election, was chosen by the assembled centuries of the people. His term was set at six months. Fabius was 58 years old, 28 years older than Hannibal, and was nicknamed “Verrucosus” or “Spotty” because of a wart on his face. His political record was strong: he had fought in the First Punic War, served as consul in 233 and 228 BC, been elected censor in 230 BC, and earned a triumph for his campaigns against the Ligurians. Normally a dictator picked his own Master of Horse, but Fabius was given Marcus Minucius Rufus, a plebeian who had been consul in 221 BC, as an unusual political gesture. Some suggested Fabius was only a pro-dictator, but he appears to have held full dictatorial powers during his term.

Fabius first worked to restore public morale, then turned to preparing Rome’s defenses. He blamed the disaster at Trasimene on the dead consul Flaminius’s neglect of religious rites, so he carefully followed all religious and civil procedures to reassure the population. At his suggestion, the Senate consulted the Sibylline Books, and a praetor was assigned to make generous sacrifices to appease the gods. With divine matters handled, Fabius began preparing for Hannibal’s possible advance into Latium, though at that time he did not know where Hannibal was or what he intended.

A game of prudence and patience

While the Romans were busy raising an army and sorting out political and religious matters, Hannibal had marched in a leisurely manner south from Hartia. His army, rested, restored to health, retrained, and re-equipped, cut a path of destruction through central Italy as they collected grain, cattle, provisions, and supplies during the march. Hannibal followed the coastal plain before turning west. Near the town of Arpi, the Roman army under Fabius made contact with the Carthaginian army and camped at Aecae, six miles away from the Carthaginian camp.

Hannibal drew up his army and offered battle, but Fabius ignored the offer and the Roman army remained in their camp. The stage was set for Fabius to reveal his plans, which would tax the patience of the Romans and the political clout of Fabius to the limit and ultimately be credited by later historians as the most prudent, if economically costly, strategy against the threat of Hannibal. The following months saw Fabius employ what would later be known as Fabian Strategy, and earn him the title of 'The Delayer'.

Despite whatever provocation Hannibal thought up, the Roman army always refused to fight pitched battles, shadowed the Carthaginians from a distance, manoeuvred to keep to the high ground to deny the Carthaginian cavalry any advantage, and always moved to keep between Rome and their enemy. The Roman army sought to encamp on grounds which were unlikely to be attacked by the Carthaginians, and Roman foragers were covered by flying columns of light infantry and cavalry at all times.

Carthaginian foragers and stragglers caught at a disadvantage were cut down whenever possible. With this strategy, Fabius left the initiative to Hannibal and failed to prevent the Carthaginian army from looting and destroying Roman and allied Italian property, but the Roman army gained invaluable combat experience and remained intact, and the threat of intervention by Fabius kept wavering Italian allies from defecting to Carthage. The destruction of a large portion of Roman economic assets tried the patience of the Roman people to the limit.

Battle

Hannibal wrapped up his plundering and decided against wintering in the plain. Fabius, with reliable supply lines, could afford to wait out his dictatorship or for the Carthaginians to make a move. Hannibal, however, had stripped the region of food and couldn't stay put without facing shortages. The Romans, following Fabius, refused to engage no matter how much Hannibal provoked them. Hannibal also didn't want to take heavy losses by assaulting the Romans in their fortified hill camps. Both commanders wanted favorable conditions, so the standoff dragged on. Eventually, the Carthaginian army moved east toward the pass by Mount Callicula, the same route they had used to enter the plain. Fabius expected this and blocked the pass with 4,000 troops, setting up his main camp on a nearby hill. Minucius then arrived with his men to reinforce him.

Hannibal carefully planned a breakout, but not through a pitched battle as the Romans hoped. The night before executing his scheme, he had most of his troops eat a big meal and go to bed early, leaving the campfires burning. He selected 2,000 oxen from captured herds, along with 2,000 camp followers to drive them and 2,000 light infantry to guard the awkward procession. Dry wood and fagots were tied to the oxen's horns.

An officer named Hasdrubal, serving as quartermaster general and later the heavy cavalry commander at Cannae, oversaw the operation. Once ready, this group moved toward the pass held by the 4,000 Romans. Their goal was not to fight or capture the pass. Instead, there was a saddle east of Fabius's camp and northwest of the pass, at the foot of Mount Callicula.

The Carthaginian light infantry were to seize and hold that saddle. According to Appian, Hannibal executed 5,000 prisoners beforehand to prevent trouble during the march, though Polybius and Livy do not mention this.